Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy

Robert Sugden

Economic Journal, 1991, vol. 101, issue 407, 751-85

Abstract: This paper looks at the philosophical foundations of rational-choice theory. It is argued that L. Savage's expected-utility axioms cannot be defended as requirements of instrumental rationality, in part because of their implications for the description of consequences. Then it is argued that common knowledge of rationality does not imply that rational game-players must be in Nash equilibrium, and for some games is an incoherent concept. Finally, the suggestion that rational-choice theory is self-defeating is examined in relation to coordination games (where the theory cannot explain the role of salience) and the concept of "resolute" choice. Copyright 1991 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1991
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