A Theory of Focal Points

Robert Sugden

Economic Journal, 1995, vol. 105, issue 430, 533-50

Abstract: The paper presents a theoretical framework that distinguishes between the strategic structure of a game (the existential game) and the way the players describe the game to themselves. Each player works with a private description of the game in which strategies are identified by labels; labels are generated by a stochastic labeling procedure. Each player chooses a decision rule which, for each possible private description, picks one of the available strategy labels. A criterion of collective rationality is applied to choices among decision rules. The implications of collective rationality are explored for a range of games with different labeling procedures. Copyright 1995 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1995
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