Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets

Daron Acemoglu and Jorn-Steffen Pischke

Economic Journal, 1999, vol. 109, issue 453, F112-42

Abstract: In this paper, the authors survey noncompetitive theories of training. With competitive labor markets, firms never pay for investments in general training, whereas when labor markets are imperfect, firm-sponsored training arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. The authors discuss a variety of evidence that supports the predictions of noncompetitive theories and they draw some tentative policy conclusions from these models.

Date: 1999
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Working Paper: Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labor Markets (1998)
Working Paper: Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labor Markets (1998)
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