Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labor Markets

Daron Acemoglu and Jorn-Steffen Pischke

No 6740, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In this paper, we survey non-competitive theories of training. With competitive labor markets, firms never pay for investments in general training, whereas when labor markets are imperfect, firm-sponsored training arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. We discuss a variety of evidence which support the predictions of non-competitive theories, and we draw some tentative policy conclusions from these models.

JEL-codes: J24 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ltv and nep-mic
Note: LS
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Published as Economic Journal, Vol.109 (February 1999): F112-F142.

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Journal Article: Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets (1999)
Working Paper: Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labor Markets (1998)
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