 Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards Dynamic OligopoliesJ. Peter Neary and Dermot Leahy Economic Journal, 2000, vol. 110, issue 463, 484-508 Abstract: We characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole's "animal spirits" taxonomy of business strategies. Without government commitment, there is an additional basis for intervention, whose sign depends on the strategic substitutability between future policy and current actions. We consider a variety of applications (to R&D spillovers, consumer switching costs, etc.) and also extensions to constrained second-best policies. Date: 2000 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:110:y:2000:i:463:p:484-508 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Economic Journal is currently edited by Martin Cripps, Steve Machin, Woulter den Haan, Andrea Galeotti, Rachel Griffith and Frederic Vermeulen More articles in Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC. |
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