Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy Towards Dynamic Oligopolies

J. Peter Neary and Dermot Leahy

Working Papers from College Dublin, Department of Political Economy-

Abstract: We characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole's "fat cats and top dogs" taxonomy of business strategies.

Keywords: TRADE POLICY; RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
Date: 1998
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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards Dynamic Oligopolies (2000)
Working Paper: Strategic Trade and Industrial PolicyTowards Dynamic Oligopolies (1998)
Working Paper: Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy Towards Dynamic Oligopolies (1998)
Working Paper: Strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies (1998)
Working Paper: Strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:dublec:98/14

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