Information Aggregation with Random Ordering: Cascades and Overconfidence

Markus Noth and Martin Weber
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Markus Noth: University of Mannheim

Economic Journal, 2003, vol. 113, issue 484, 166-189

Abstract: In economic models, it is usually assumed that agents aggregate their private information with all available public information correctly and completely. In this experiment, we identify subjects" updating procedures and analyse the consequences for the aggregation process. Decisions can be based on private information with known quality and on the observed decisions of other participants. In this setting with random ordering, information cascades are observable and agents" overconfidence has a positive effect on avoiding a non--revealing aggregation process. However, overconfidence reduces welfare in general. Copyright Royal Economic Society 2003.

Date: 2003
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Related works:
Working Paper: Information Aggregation with Random Ordering: Cascades and Overconfidence (2000)
Working Paper: Information aggregation with random ordering: cascades and overconficence (2000)
Working Paper: Information Aggregation with Random Ordering: Cascades and Overconfidence (2000)
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