Information aggregation with random ordering: cascades and overconficence

Markus Nöth and Martin Weber

No 00-34, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: In economic models, it is usually assumed that agents aggregate their private and all available public information correctly and completely. In this experiment, we identify subjects' updating procedures and analyze the consequences for the aggregation process. Decisions can be based on private information with known quality and observed decisions of other participants. In this setting with random ordering, information cascades are observable and agents' overconfidence has a positive effect on avoiding a non-revealing aggregation process but it reduces welfare in general.

Keywords: aggregation; Bayes' rule; cascades; experiment; overconfidence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2825/1/dp00_34.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Information Aggregation with Random Ordering: Cascades and Overconfidence (2003)
Working Paper: Information Aggregation with Random Ordering: Cascades and Overconfidence (2000)
Working Paper: Information Aggregation with Random Ordering: Cascades and Overconfidence (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:spaper:2825

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