The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects

Francoise Forges, Jean-François Mertens and Rajiv Vohra

Econometrica, 2002, vol. 70, issue 5, 1865-1892

Abstract: In a differential information economy with quasi-linear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically nonempty. However, we exhibit a well-behaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms. Copyright The Econometric Society 2002.

Date: 2002
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Working Paper: The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects (2001)
Working Paper: The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects (2001)
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