The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects

Francoise Forges, Jean-François Mertens and Rajiv Vohra

No 2001001, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In a differential information economy with quasi-linear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically non-empty. However, we exhibit a wellbehaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms.

Keywords: Core; exchange economy; asymmetric information; incentive compatibility; ex ante; transferable utility; absence of wealth effects; quasi-linear (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects (2002)
Working Paper: The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2001001

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