Long Cheap Talk

Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart

Econometrica, 2003, vol. 71, issue 6, 1619-1660

Abstract: With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message-even when one side is strictly better informed than the other. ("Cheap talk" means plain conversation-unmediated, nonbinding, and payoff-irrelevant.) This work characterizes the equilibrium payoffs for all two-person games in which one side is better informed than the other and cheap talk is permitted. Copyright The Econometric Society 2003.

Date: 2003
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