Long Cheap Talk

Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message - even when one side is strictly better informed than the other.

Keywords: cheap talk; communication; long conversation; incomplete information; game theory; signalling; joint lottery; dimartingale; di-span (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 59 pages
Date: 2002-02, Revised 2002-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Published in Econometrica, 2003, vol. 71, pp. 1619-1660.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~hart/papers/long.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Long Cheap Talk (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp284

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael Simkin ().