Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences

Anna Bogomolnaia and Herve Moulin

Econometrica, 2004, vol. 72, issue 1, 257-279

Abstract: We consider bilateral matching problems where each person views those on the other side of the market as either acceptable or unacceptable: an acceptable mate is preferred to remaining single, and the latter to an unacceptable mate; all acceptable mates are welfare-wise identical. Copyright Econometric Society 2004.

Date: 2004
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Working Paper: Random Matching under Dichotomous Preferences (2001)
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