Random Matching under Dichotomous Preferences

Herve Moulin and Anna Bogomolnaia

Working Papers from Rice University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider bilateral matching problems where each person views those on the other side of the market as either acceptable or unacceptable: an acceptable mate is preferred to remaining single, and the latter to an unacceptable mate; all acceptable mates are welfare-wise identical. Using randomization, many efficient and fair matching methods define strategy-proof revelation mechanisms. Randomly selecting a priority ordering of the participants is a simple example. Equalizing as much as possible the probability of getting an acceptable mate across all participants stands out for its normative and incentives properties: the profile of probabilities is Lorenz dominant, and the revelation mechanism is group-strategy-proof for each side of the market. Our results apply to the random assignment problem as well.

JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Journal Article: Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:riceco:2001-03

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