Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations

Martin Cripps, George Mailath and Larry Samuelson

Econometrica, 2004, vol. 72, issue 2, 407-432

Abstract: We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for noncredible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring. Copyright The Econometric Society 2004.

Date: 2004
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Working Paper: Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations (2010)
Working Paper: Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations (2003)
Working Paper: Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations (2002)
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