Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations
George Mailath () and
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L. Samuelson: University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute
No 17, Working papers from Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems
JEL-codes: C70 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations (2010)
Journal Article: Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations (2004)
Working Paper: Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:att:wimass:200217
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