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Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations

Martin Cripps, George Mailath () and L. Samuelson
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L. Samuelson: University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute

No 17, Working papers from Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems

JEL-codes: C70 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~gmailath/pubpapers/Ecta%20Mar%202004.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations (2010) Downloads
Journal Article: Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations (2003) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:att:wimass:200217

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