Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
Johannes Hörner and
Econometrica, 2005, vol. 73, issue 2, 377-415
We introduce a class of strategies that generalizes examples constructed in two-player games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if, after every private history, each player's continuation strategy is optimal independently of his belief about his opponents' private histories. We provide a simple and sharp characterization of equilibrium payoffs using those strategies. While such strategies support a large set of payoffs, they are not rich enough to generate a folk theorem in most games besides the prisoner's dilemma, even when noise vanishes. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.
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