Details about Wojciech Olszewski

Access statistics for papers by Wojciech Olszewski.

Last updated 2009-02-18. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pol76

Working Papers

2022

1. Pareto Improvements in the Contest for College Admissions
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (9)

2008

2. Falsifiability
   PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania View citations (2)
3. Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring
   PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania View citations (13)
   Also in Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (2008) View citations (1)
4. Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version
   PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
5. Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests
   PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania View citations (17)
   See also Journal Article Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests, Econometrica, Econometric Society (2008) View citations (19) (2008)
6. Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests
   PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania View citations (10)
   Also in Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (2006) View citations (2)

2005

7. The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring
   NajEcon Working Paper Reviews, www.najecon.org View citations (22)
   See also Journal Article The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring, Econometrica, Econometric Society (2006) View citations (47) (2006)

2004

8. The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring
   2004 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics View citations (1)

2003

9. Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games
   Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine View citations (3)
   See also Journal Article Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games, Econometrica, Econometric Society (2005) View citations (70) (2005)

Journal Articles

2008

1. Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests
   Econometrica, 2008, 76, (6), 1437-1466 View citations (19)
   See also Working Paper Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests, PIER Working Paper Archive (2008) View citations (17) (2008)

2007

2. A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence
   Theoretical Economics, 2007, 2, (4) View citations (38)
3. Contracts and uncertainty
   Theoretical Economics, 2007, 2, (1), 1-13 View citations (10)
4. George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson, Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships, Oxford University Press, New York, NY (2006) ISBN 978-0-19-530079-6 pages i-xviii and 1-645
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 59, (2), 408-410

2006

5. Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2006, 128, (1), 164-186 View citations (1)
6. The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
   Econometrica, 2006, 74, (6), 1499-1544 View citations (47)
   See also Working Paper The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring, NajEcon Working Paper Reviews (2005) View citations (22) (2005)

2005

7. Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
   Econometrica, 2005, 73, (2), 377-415 View citations (70)
   See also Working Paper Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games, Levine's Working Paper Archive (2003) View citations (3) (2003)

2004

8. Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 46, (1), 88-114 View citations (12)
9. Informal communication
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2004, 117, (2), 180-200 View citations (27)
10. Politically Determined Income Inequality and the Provision of Public Goods
    Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2004, 6, (5), 707-735 View citations (8)

2003

11. A simple and general solution to King Solomon's problem
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, 42, (2), 315-318 View citations (13)

1998

12. Note Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter?
    International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, 27, (1), 147-156 View citations (5)