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Details about Wojciech Olszewski

Homepage:http://www.faculty.econ.northwestern.edu/faculty/olszewski/
Workplace:Department of Economics, Northwestern University, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Wojciech Olszewski.

Last updated 2009-02-18. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pol76


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Working Papers

2008

  1. Falsifiability
    PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania Downloads View citations (2)
  2. Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring
    PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania Downloads View citations (13)
    Also in Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (2008) Downloads View citations (1)
  3. Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version
    PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania Downloads
  4. Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests
    PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania Downloads View citations (12)
    See also Journal Article in Econometrica (2008)
  5. Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests
    PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania Downloads View citations (9)
    Also in Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (2006) Downloads View citations (2)

2005

  1. The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring
    NajEcon Working Paper Reviews, www.najecon.org Downloads View citations (26)
    See also Journal Article in Econometrica (2006)

2004

  1. The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring
    2004 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics Downloads View citations (1)

2003

  1. Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games
    Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article in Econometrica (2005)

Journal Articles

2008

  1. Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests
    Econometrica, 2008, 76, (6), 1437-1466 Downloads View citations (13)
    See also Working Paper (2008)

2007

  1. A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence
    Theoretical Economics, 2007, 2, (4) Downloads View citations (31)
  2. Contracts and uncertainty
    Theoretical Economics, 2007, 2, (1), 1-13 Downloads View citations (6)
  3. George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson, Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships, Oxford University Press, New York, NY (2006) ISBN 978-0-19-530079-6 pages i-xviii and 1-645
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 59, (2), 408-410 Downloads

2006

  1. Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2006, 128, (1), 164-186 Downloads
  2. The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
    Econometrica, 2006, 74, (6), 1499-1544 Downloads View citations (37)
    See also Working Paper (2005)

2005

  1. Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
    Econometrica, 2005, 73, (2), 377-415 Downloads View citations (66)
    See also Working Paper (2003)

2004

  1. Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 46, (1), 88-114 Downloads View citations (12)
  2. Informal communication
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2004, 117, (2), 180-200 Downloads View citations (23)
  3. Politically Determined Income Inequality and the Provision of Public Goods
    Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2004, 6, (5), 707-735 Downloads View citations (7)

2003

  1. A simple and general solution to King Solomon's problem
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, 42, (2), 315-318 Downloads View citations (12)

1998

  1. Note Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter?
    International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, 27, (1), 147-156 Downloads View citations (3)
 
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