The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring
Wojciech Olszewski and
No 475, 2004 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics
"Selection in Dynamic Games" 1. Assortative Matching with costly search, presented by Alp Atakan 2. A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium with Application to Decentralized Collusion, presented by Peter Eso 3. Noisy evolution in Normal form Games, presented by Christoph Kuzmics 4. The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring presented by Johannes Horner Abstract: We study repeated games in which monitoring is imperfect and private. We prove the folk theorem for all two-player (finite) games assuming that the monitoring is almost perfect, but not necessarily almost public
Keywords: imperfect private monitoring; repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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