Group-separations based on the repeated prisoners’ dilemma games

Yuankan Huang and Takehiro Inohara

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2015, vol. 256, issue C, 267-275

Abstract: We model group-separations in an n-player set. In the n-player set, every two players play an infinitely repeated two-player prisoners’ dilemma game. Each player takes a mixed strategy to play the game and trigger strategy is used to punish the deviator. Let all players share a common discount factor δ. We find that with the variation of δ, the n-player set is separated into several subsets such that (1) for any two players in any two different subsets, their strategy profile is not a subgame perfect equilibrium and (2) each subset cannot be separated into several subsets that satisfy (1). Such subsets are called groups and the separation is called group-separation. We aim to specify the intervals (of δ) such that group-separations emerge. Particularly, we focus on the relationship between the interval and the form of each group-separation.

Keywords: Subgame perfect equilibrium; Trigger strategy; Group-separation; complete graph (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:256:y:2015:i:c:p:267-275

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2015.01.040

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