The arising of cooperation in Cournot duopoly games

S.S. Askar, Ahmad M. Alshamrani and K. Alnowibet

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2016, vol. 273, issue C, 535-542

Abstract: In literature, several studies have been made to study conflict among duopolistic Cournot game with incomplete information. This paper attempts to investigate equilibrium stability of a nonlinear Cournot duopoly game on which cooperation may be existed among firms. Discrete time scales under the assumption of logarithmic price function and linear cost are used to build our models in the proposed games. We study here an adjustment dynamic strategy based on the so-called tit-for-tat strategy. For each model, the stability analysis of the fixed point is analyzed. Numerical simulations are carried out to show the complex behavior of the proposed models and to point out the impact of the models’ parameters on the cooperation.

Keywords: Discrete duopoly; cooperation; Tit-for-tat; Stability; Bifurcation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:273:y:2016:i:c:p:535-542

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2015.10.027

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