The payoff matrix of repeated asymmetric 2×2 gamesAuthor-Name: Elshobaky, Entisarat M

Essam El-Seidy and Mohammad A. Taha

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2016, vol. 274, issue C, 393-402

Abstract: Many researches in game theory have been devoted to study the symmetric contest between the contestants. This is due to the computational advantage in this type of game. In contrast, asymmetric games are more complicated in mathematical computations than the symmetric one. This article is particularly interested in the model of asymmetric games. In this model, we cannot interchange the identities of the players without interchanging the payoff of the strategies. This model differs from the symmetric model, where each player has two different choices from the two choices of the other one. We consider that the round of the game is infinitely repeated (infinitely repeated and asymmetric 2×2 game). The payoff matrix corresponding to all possible strategies of the game is obtained. Furthermore, we will apply the resulting matrix in two examples. During this, we will draw the attention towards the behavior of some of the strategies and the evolutionary stability.

Keywords: Payoff matrix; Repeated games; Symmetric game; Asymmetric game; Evolutionary stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:274:y:2016:i:c:p:393-402

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2015.11.003

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