Iterated symmetric three-player prisoner’s dilemma game

Essam El-Seidy and Karim.M. Soliman

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2016, vol. 282, issue C, 117-127

Abstract: Although, most game theory researches on the prisoner’s dilemma have centered on two-player models, it is possible to create it to be consisted of three or even more players. In this paper, we are interested in the model of three-player iterated prisoner’s dilemma game where, each player has two choices. The action of each strategy in this model depends on the previous action of the last round. Each strategy is presented by finite state of automata. We used a computer program to calculate the payoff values resulting from the actions of all possible strategies. We study the behavior of four different strategies related to Tit for Tat concept. The conditions of each strategy to be the best are determined. In Appendix section, we design an algorithm and implement it using the Java programing language to facilitate the calculations.

Keywords: Iterated games; Prisoner’s dilemma; Payoff matrix; Symmetric games; Tit For Tat strategy; Evolutionary games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:282:y:2016:i:c:p:117-127

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2016.02.009

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