Competition of domestic manufacturer and foreign supplier under sustainable development objectives of government
Ashkan Hafezalkotob
Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2017, vol. 292, issue C, 294-308
Abstract:
Currently, governments that maintain sustainable objectives often adopt financial incentives and deterrents to orchestrate the outsourcing decisions of manufacturers. This work investigates the effect of government financial intervention on the competition and cooperation of two manufacturers. One manufacturer pursues an in-house production strategy, and the other outsources production to a foreign supplier. Regarding the financial, environmental and social objectives of the government and the leadership role of the government in the market, this problem is formulated as a multi-level, multi-objective decision making model. We found that specific boundaries for tariffs set by the government lead to a stable competitive or monopolistic market. A comprehensive analysis of the government policies reveals the possible outcomes of the policies regarding the sustainable objectives.
Keywords: Outsourcing; Game theory; Government financial intervention; Sustainable development objectives; Cooperation and competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:292:y:2017:i:c:p:294-308
DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2016.07.007
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