Enjoying cooperative games: The R package GameTheory

Sebastián Cano-Berlanga, José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez and Cori Vilella

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2017, vol. 305, issue C, 381-393

Abstract: This paper focuses on cooperative games with transferable utility. We propose the computation of three solutions, the Shapley value for n agents, the nucleolus with a maximum of four agents and the per capita nucleolus. The current approach is also focused on conflicting claims problems, a particular case of coalitional games. We provide the computation of the most well-known and used claims solutions: the proportional, the constrained equal awards, the constrained equal losses, the Talmud, the random arrival and the adjusted proportional rules.

Keywords: Cooperative game; Shapley value; Nucleolus; Claims problem; Bankruptcy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:305:y:2017:i:c:p:381-393

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2017.02.010

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