# Enjoying cooperative games: The R package GameTheory

*Cano-Berlanga, Sebastián*,
*Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel* and
*Cori Vilella*

*Applied Mathematics and Computation*, 2017, vol. 305, issue C, 381-393

**Abstract:**
This paper focuses on cooperative games with transferable utility. We propose the computation of three solutions, the Shapley value for n agents, the nucleolus with a maximum of four agents and the per capita nucleolus. The current approach is also focused on conflicting claims problems, a particular case of coalitional games. We provide the computation of the most well-known and used claims solutions: the proportional, the constrained equal awards, the constrained equal losses, the Talmud, the random arrival and the adjusted proportional rules.

**Keywords:** Cooperative game; Shapley value; Nucleolus; Claims problem; Bankruptcy (search for similar items in EconPapers)

**JEL-codes:** C71 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)

**Date:** 2017

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**Persistent link:** https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:305:y:2017:i:c:p:381-393

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