Convergence of strong time-consistent payment schemes in dynamic games
Hao Sun and
Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2017, vol. 315, issue C, 96-112
The problem of consistency of a solution over time remains an important issue in cooperative dynamic games. Payoffs to players prescribed by an inconsistent solution may not be achievable since such a solution is extremely sensitive to its revision in the course of a game developing along an agreed upon cooperative behavior. The paper proposes a strong time-consistent payment scheme which is stable to a revision of cooperative set solutions, e.g., the core. Using a linear transformation of the solution, it becomes possible to obtain non-negative payments to players. In the paper, we also deal with a limit linear transformation of the solution whose convergence is proved. Developing a non-negative strong time-consistent payment scheme in a closed form, we guarantee that the solution supported by the scheme will not be revised over time.
Keywords: Game theory; Dynamic games; Linear transformation; Cooperation; Strong time consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:315:y:2017:i:c:p:96-112
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