 Stable strategies analysis based on the utility of Z-number in the evolutionary gamesBingyi Kang, Gyan Chhipi-Shrestha, Yong Deng, Kasun Hewage and Rehan Sadiq Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2018, vol. 324, issue C, 202-217 Abstract: Evolutionary games with the fuzzy set are attracting growing interest. While among previous studies, the role of the reliability of knowledge in such an infrastructure is still virgin and may become a fascinating issue. Z-number is combined with “restriction” and “reliability”, which is an efficient framework to simulate the thinking of human. In this paper, the stable strategies analysis based on the utility of Z-number in the evolutionary games is proposed, which can simulate the procedure of human’s competition and cooperation more authentically and more flexibly. Some numerical examples and an application are used to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed methodology. Results show that total utility of Z-number can be used as an index to extend the classical evolutionary games into ones linguistic-based, which is applicable in the real applications since the payoff matrix is always determined by the knowledge of human using uncertain information, e.g., (outcome of the next year, about fifty thousand dollars, likely). Keywords: Strategy analysis; Z-number; Evolutionary games; Reliability (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:324:y:2018:i:c:p:202-217 DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2017.12.006 Access Statistics for this article Applied Mathematics and Computation is currently edited by Theodore Simos More articles in Applied Mathematics and Computation from Elsevier |
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