Promote of cooperation in networked multiagent system based on fitness control
Hongqiu Zhu and
Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2018, vol. 339, issue C, 805-811
How did cooperative strategy evolve remains an open question across disciplines. In most previous studies, they mainly consider the analyzing of game dynamics on the networked multiagent system under different mechanisms. However, there often exists a “government” who regulates the strategies of agents centralized or decentralized in reality. Motivated by this fact, we introduce a fitness control method in this paper, and investigate the strength of external fitness control on the game dynamics in networked multiagent system. According to the classic Monte Carlo simulation, we found that the fitness control rule can significantly enhance the cooperation level in networked multiagent system. In particular, we found that the stronger the local fitness control is, the more widespread cooperative strategy becomes. More interestingly, we found that although the local fitness control is less information needed, it is more powerful in cooperation promotion than that of global fitness control rule. Thus, it is practically significant and will provide a new insight into the control of game dynamics in networked multiagent system for the further research.
Keywords: Social dilemma; Cooperation; Fitness control; Multiagent system (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:339:y:2018:i:c:p:805-811
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