A stochastic Pairwise Fermi rule modified by utilizing the average in payoff differences of neighbors leads to increased network reciprocity in spatial prisoner's dilemma games

Keisuke Nagashima and Jun Tanimoto

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2019, vol. 361, issue C, 661-669

Abstract: In a 2 × 2 prisoner's dilemma (PD) game, network reciprocity is one of the mechanisms for increasing social viscosity, which leads to a cooperative equilibrium. The Pairwise Fermi (PW-Fermi) rule has been accepted as an updating protocol, as its stochasticity is similar to the real-world human decision-making process. In this paper, we elucidated a modification to the PW-Fermi rule by utilizing the averaged payoff difference instead of the simple payoff difference between a focal agent and their neighbors. This led to a significantly enhanced level of network reciprocity. The mechanism of this enhancement is clarified by discussing the concepts of the enduring period (END) and the expanding period (EXP).

Keywords: Evolutionary game on networks; Prisoner's dilemma; Network reciprocity; Gaming neighborhood; Strategy-adaptation neighborhood (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:361:y:2019:i:c:p:661-669

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2019.05.034

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