Conditional neutral punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
Chen Liu and
Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2020, vol. 368, issue C
Punishment plays an important role in promoting cooperation. In real society, individuals tend to punish other players based on certain conditions rather than punish them directly. Thus, we introduce a conditional neutral punishment mechanism and study how this mechanism affects the evolution of cooperation. Namely, an individual can punish his/her neighbors with the opposite strategy when his/her payoff is lower than the average payoff of his/her neighbors. The simulation results show that this mechanism promotes cooperation effectively even with antisocial punishment. By adopting such a mechanism, cooperative punishers form shields to protect cooperators inside, while defective punishers hide behind defectors without punishing anyone.
Keywords: Conditional punishment; Strategy-neutral punishment; Evolutionary games; Social dilemmas; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:368:y:2020:i:c:s0096300319307908
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