EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Zero-determinant strategies in repeated asymmetric games

Mohammad A. Taha and Ayman Ghoneim

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2020, vol. 369, issue C

Abstract: Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies are conditional strategies which allow players adopting them to establish a relation between their expected payoffs and those of their opponents. The ZD strategies were investigated in different models including finite and infinite repeated two players’ games, multiplayer games, continuous action spaces and alternating move games. However, all previous studies considered only symmetric games between players, i.e., players have the same strategies and the same associated payoffs, thus the players’ identities are interchangeable without affecting the game's dynamics. In this study, we analytically model and derive the ZD strategies for asymmetric two players’ games, focusing on one-memory strategies and infinite repeated encounters. We derive the analytical bounds of equalizer and extortionate ZD strategies in 2 × 2 asymmetric games, which differ from the symmetric games case. Furthermore, we derive under what conditions a player using an extortionate ZD strategy will get a higher expected payoff than his/her opponent. Finally using a numerical example, we investigate ZD strategies in 2 × 2 asymmetric prisoner's dilemma game.

Keywords: Asymmetric games; Repeated games; Zero-determinant strategies; Prisoner's dilemma game; Stochastic strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0096300319308549
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:369:y:2020:i:c:s0096300319308549

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2019.124862

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Mathematics and Computation is currently edited by Theodore Simos

More articles in Applied Mathematics and Computation from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:369:y:2020:i:c:s0096300319308549