 Evolutionary dynamics of the interdependent security games on complex networkZhen Wang, Chaofan Li, Xing Jin, Hong Ding, Guanghai Cui and Lanping Yu Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2021, vol. 399, issue C Abstract: With the development of information technology, the infrastructure between enterprises and the connections between businesses show complex network characteristics. The security investment made by an enterprise in a network has an impact on its neighbors, but also bears the impact of its neighbors’ security investments. Such individual interaction problems are often modeled as interdependent security games (IDS). In this paper, we study IDS models under three different attack scenarios: the total effort, the weakest link and the best shot. We use evolutionary game theory to explore the dynamics of social payoffs and the average social investments of these three models under different network topologies. The results show that under the total effort model, individuals are more inclined to increase their investments, while under the weakest link and best shot models, individuals choose to minimize their investments due to selfishness. Finally, we study the cluster effect under different network structures and find the threshold at which it exists. Keywords: Interdependent security games; Evolutionary game; Complex network (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:399:y:2021:i:c:s0096300321000990 DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2021.126051 Access Statistics for this article Applied Mathematics and Computation is currently edited by Theodore Simos More articles in Applied Mathematics and Computation from Elsevier |
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