Uneven Resources network promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
Zi-Ren Wang,
Zheng-Hong Deng,
Huan-Bo Wang,
HuXiong Li and
Fei-Wang X
Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2022, vol. 413, issue C
Abstract:
Scholars explored cooperative behavior on different network; however they did not consider the resource distribution and consumption on them. In our work, we propose a kind of uneven resource distribution network model, in which players can consume finite resources to survive. In our model, firstly, there are four players, and then we imitate real organism behavior, such as eating, migration, game, leaning, and reproduction. Meanwhile, during this process, finite resource also decreases with players’ consumption. After numerical simulation, we find that defectors can occupy the most resource-rich areas at first, but they cannot survive in hostile area and decrease rapidly. While cooperators always keep growing. In addition, when resources decrease substantially, cooperative behavior can be promoted. This also sprouts new insights on survival and development of cooperative behavior.
Keywords: Cooperation; Uneven resources network; Prisoner's dilemma game; Evolutionary game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0096300321007037
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:413:y:2022:i:c:s0096300321007037
DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2021.126619
Access Statistics for this article
Applied Mathematics and Computation is currently edited by Theodore Simos
More articles in Applied Mathematics and Computation from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().