Wealth-based rule favors cooperation in costly public goods games when individual selection is inevitable

Jianwei Wang, Wei Chen, Fengyuan Yu, Jialu He and Wenshu Xu

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2022, vol. 414, issue C

Abstract: Individual selection, as an effective mechanism, is often used in spatial evolutionary games to promote cooperation. Previous research assumes that, individual selection usually occurs with people who fail to meet a certain criterion. However, individual selection is usually inevitable, regardless of whether players in population cooperate or defect. This paper studies the effects of wealth-based rule in costly public goods games when individual selection is inevitable. Specifically, we assume that only the top V individuals with relatively high cumulative payoffs in each group can be selected for costly PGG. The results show that when V is large, the increase of participation cost has slight inhibitory effects on the evolution of cooperation, but it alleviates the polarization of individuals. However, when V is small, the increase of participation cost within a certain range promotes cooperation prosperity, but it also causes an increase in the proportion of polarized individuals and a widening of the wealth gap between rich and poor individuals.

Keywords: Individual selection; Evolutionary game; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:414:y:2022:i:c:s0096300321007529

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2021.126668

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