Effects of individual and collective decision rule on cooperation in public goods game

Jalal Eddine Bahbouhi, Saif Islam Bouderba, Abdelali Elkouay and Najem Moussa

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2024, vol. 469, issue C

Abstract: Research on public goods game has traditionally focused on studying the effects of punishment and reward in experimental settings, commonly known as standard games. However, these standard games often examine isolated interactions among individuals, leading to varying results based on factors such as the population studied, number of participants, and geographical context. Consequently, the understanding of cooperation evolution remains imprecise.

Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Public goods game; Punishment; Reward; Free riders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:469:y:2024:i:c:s0096300324000250

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2024.128553

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