A social monitoring mechanism for third-party judges promotes cooperation in evolutionary games

Qianxi Yang and Yanlong Yang

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2024, vol. 483, issue C

Abstract: Corruption of third-party judges seriously undermines the level of cooperation. Without intervention, more corruptors and defectors would emerge, disrupting social harmony. Therefore, introducing an anti-corruption mechanism is crucial for the evolution of cooperation. In this paper, we propose a social monitoring mechanism to monitor third-party judges so that their payoffs are affected by the proportions of cooperators. Monte Carlo simulations on periodic boundary lattices. The results show that the social monitoring mechanism is effective in promoting cooperation and inhibiting corruption, and enhances the effectiveness of zealots in promoting cooperation. This facilitation effect is not only manifested in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game but also in the Snowdrift Game, which confirms the robustness of the results. Our research provides new insights for solving social dilemmas and curbing corruption.

Keywords: Evolutionary game; Reward; Punishment; Cooperation; Corruption; Supervise (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:483:y:2024:i:c:s0096300324004521

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2024.128991

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