The effect of ecological compensation on a coevolutionary common pool resource game

Liyan Gao, Qiuhui Pan and Mingfeng He

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2025, vol. 490, issue C

Abstract: Ecological compensation plays an important role in the governance of renewable resource. When the resource stock is not higher than the compensation threshold, the defector of excessive effort pays compensation cost to restore resources. This paper establishes a coupled social ecosystem based on the ecological compensation mechanism by using evolutionary game theory. It is found that ecological compensation mechanism can promote cooperation, realize the sustainable utilization of resources, narrow the fitness gap between agents and facilitate higher payoff for the population. There exists an optimal compensation intensity that makes the system in an ideal state with the highest cooperation level, sustainable resources and maximum population fitness. Compensation intensity exceeding the optimal value has no additional influence on the system. The impact of compensation threshold on the system is jump like and there are two critical values of compensation threshold. As long as the compensation threshold exceeds the larger critical value, the system can reach the ideal state. These findings provide theoretical basis for the relevant institutions to better formulate ecological compensation policies.

Keywords: Ecological compensation; Social ecosystem; Common pool resource game; Tragedy of the commons (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:490:y:2025:i:c:s0096300324006696

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2024.129208

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