Design of Pareto optimal CO2 cap-and-trade policies for deregulated electricity networks
Felipe Feijoo and
Tapas K. Das
Applied Energy, 2014, vol. 119, issue C, 371-383
Among the CO2 emission reduction programs, cap-and-trade (C&T) is one of the most used policies. Economic studies have shown that C&T policies for electricity networks, while reducing emissions, will likely increase price and decrease consumption of electricity. This paper presents a two layer mathematical–statistical model to develop Pareto optimal designs for CO2 cap-and-trade policies. The bottom layer finds, for a given C&T policy, equilibrium bidding strategies of the competing generators while maximizing social welfare via a DC optimal power flow (DC-OPF) model. We refer to this layer as policy evaluation. The top layer (called policy optimization) involves design of Pareto optimal C&T policies over a planning horizon. The performance measures that are considered for the purpose of design are social welfare and the corresponding system marginal price (MP), CO2 emissions, and electricity consumption level.
Keywords: Electricity networks; Cap-and-trade; Game theory; MPEC/EPEC (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:appene:v:119:y:2014:i:c:p:371-383
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