Asymmetric learning ability promotes cooperation in structured populations

Zhilong Deng, Mao Deming and Dai Dameng

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2018, vol. 107, issue C, 88-91

Abstract: In this paper, we consider an asymmetric learning ability in structured population. The rate of strategy adoption from one randomly neighbor is controlled by the payoff difference and a factor α. Players of type B will think over α (α > 1) times when he decides whether to adopt his opponent's strategy. While players of type A just consider only once. The concentration of players A and B are denoted by v and 1−v and remains unchanged during the simulations. Through numerous computing simulations, we find that our new setup of asymmetric learning ability can promote the evolution cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. Furthermore, in order to explore the generality of this finding, we have tested the results on spatial public good games and random regular graphs.

Keywords: Asymmetric; Learning ability; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960077917305210
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:107:y:2018:i:c:p:88-91

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2017.12.019

Access Statistics for this article

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals is currently edited by Stefano Boccaletti and Stelios Bekiros

More articles in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thayer, Thomas R. ().