The evolution of cooperation in spatial multigame with voluntary participation

Zhenghong Deng, Yijie Huang, Zhiyang Gu, Zhilong Deng and Jiwei Xu

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2018, vol. 109, issue C, 41-46

Abstract: In the real life, we often simultaneously encounter various social dilemmas, which are also inclined to be voluntarily participated in, instead of previous assumption's compulsory participation in. Accounting on this realistic scenario, we have introduced the mechanism that the individuals have access to different payoff matrices corresponding to different social dilemmas to participate in the multigame with three strategies to choose, including cooperation, defection, going it alone. Furthermore, we set a proportion ψ/2 of the population to play the Prisoner's Dilemma, a proportion ψ/2 of the population to play Snowdrift and a proportion 1−ψ of the population to play the weak Prisoner's Dilemma, which results in the fact that the mean payoff matrix returns to the basic weak PD. Though numerical simulations, we find that for the smaller temptation to defect, the cooperation can be enhanced by the diversity of the sucker's payoff in the multigame contrast to the basic case. In addition, when the contribution of sucker's payoff is larger or more players choose to play the Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift, the cooperators become more dominated.

Keywords: Multigame; Three strategies; Smaller temptation; Cooperation; Sucker's payoff (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:109:y:2018:i:c:p:41-46

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2018.02.013

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