The evolution of cooperation in multi-games with aspiration-driven updating rule
Yi Jie Huang,
Zheng Hong Deng,
Qun Song,
Tao Wu,
Zhi Long Deng and
Ming yu Gao
Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2019, vol. 128, issue C, 313-317
Abstract:
We introduce multi-games with aspiration-driven updating rule and investigate the evolution of cooperation. In our work, a percentage of players randomly choose to play the PDG, while the remaining players play SG. Meanwhile, a part of players randomly select to use the aspiration-driven updating rule, and the other part of players select to use the Fermi-function updating rule. We find that both the diversity of sucker's payoff and updating rule have a positive effect on the cooperation. Besides, when the contribution of the sucker's payoff is larger or more players use the aspiration-driven rule to update the strategy, more cooperators appear derived from the spatial distribution of strategies and special network reciprocity. What is more, when more players choose to play SG and simultaneously use the aspiration-driven rule, cooperators gradually flourish. In addition, we also reveal that the easily contented players prefer to cooperate.
Keywords: Multi-games; Aspiration-driven updating rule; Cooperation; Network reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:128:y:2019:i:c:p:313-317
DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2019.08.004
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