 The evolution of cooperation in multi-games with popularity-driven fitness calculationZheng-Hong Deng, Zi-Ren Wang, Huan-Bo Wang and Lin Xu Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2021, vol. 151, issue C Abstract: Popularity-driven fitness updating rule has been confirmed to be an effective mechanism to understand the evolution of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game (PD). Inspired by this, we explore cooperation behavior in pure dilemma and multigames with popularity-driven updating rule. And we obtain the popularity by calculating player's fitness via parameter α. Numerous simulations show that different update rules in pure PD or snowdrift (SD) dilemma perform different on promoting cooperative behavior under S, T-values by comparing with mean field results and then comparing the spatial results of various updates. While in multigames, we observe that positive α can lead cooperators grow and thrive as the proportion of SD increases. On the other hand, negative α also can enhance cooperation, but hardly dominate in the population. Meanwhile, compared with zero α (traditional version), it has a stronger impact on cooperation when SD proportion is small. As the frequency of SD increases, the situation reversed. Keywords: Cooperation; Multigames; Popularity-driven fitness calculation; Network reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:151:y:2021:i:c:s0960077921006524 DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2021.111298 Access Statistics for this article Chaos, Solitons & Fractals is currently edited by Stefano Boccaletti and Stelios Bekiros More articles in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals from Elsevier |
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