A win-stay-lose-learn mechanism based on aspiration can promote cooperation in a multigame

Chen Chu, Simin Cui, Zheng Yuan and Chunbin Yu

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2022, vol. 159, issue C

Abstract: A major current focus in solving social dilemmas is how to ensure the sustainability of cooperation. In this work, we extend the traditional aspiration-based win-stay-lose-learn updating rule. Specifically, players maintain not only the strategy but also the game type if their payoffs are larger than the aspiration; otherwise, they synchronously change the game type and adopt a new strategy. We find that the present rule remarkably facilitates the evolution of cooperation and can maintain high cooperation given a large temptation to defect. The potential reason can be explained by the game transition caused by each player's aspiration.

Keywords: Win-stay-lose-learn; Social dilemma; Game transition; Game theory; Multigame (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:159:y:2022:i:c:s0960077922003356

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2022.112125

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