Time-dependent effects hinder cooperation on the public goods game

Gaspar Alfaro and Miguel A.F. Sanjuan

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2022, vol. 160, issue C

Abstract: The public goods game is a model of a society investing some assets and regaining a profit, although can also model biological populations. In the classic public goods game only two strategies compete: either cooperate or defect; a third strategy is often implemented to asses punishment, which is a mechanism to promote cooperation. The conditions of the game can be of a dynamical nature, therefore we study time-dependent effects such an as oscillation in the enhancement factor, which accounts for productivity changes over time. Furthermore, we continue to study time dependencies on the game with a delay on the punishment time. We conclude that both the oscillations on the productivity and the punishment delay concur in the detriment of cooperation.

Keywords: Evolutionary dynamics; Social games; Public goods; Punishment; Numerical simulations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:160:y:2022:i:c:s0960077922004167

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2022.112206

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