Coevolution of consensus and cooperation in evolutionary Hegselmann–Krause dilemma with the cooperation cost

Changwei Huang, Yongzhao Hou and Wenchen Han

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2023, vol. 168, issue C

Abstract: In this work, we focus on the opinion consensus involved with evolutionary games based on Hegselmann–Krause model. Agents can choose to be defective, unwilling to change their opinions, or cooperative, willing to change opinions following the ordinary Hegselmann–Krause rule. The payoff of an agent is assumed as the local benefit, depicting the local consensus around this agent, paying the opinion variation cost, the effort to change the agent’s opinion. Increasing the cost hinders the preference of cooperation and suppresses forging consensus. On the contrary, increasing the bounded confidence, as well as the average degree, helps agents gain a higher benefit and reach consensus. The consensus is the tradeoff between supportive factors, a high confidence bound or a large average degree, and the drawback, a high variation cost. When these two competitive factors share a same strength, it costs the longest time for the population reaching consensus. It is verified by numerical simulations on not only scale-free networks but also Erdös-Rényi random networks.

Keywords: Opinion consensus; Evolutionary game; Cooperative cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:168:y:2023:i:c:s0960077923001169

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2023.113215

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