The evolution of cooperation affected by unidirectional acceptability mechanism on interdependent networks

Ran Su, Zhi-Ming Fang, Qing-Yi Hao, Chun Sheng and Yuan-Jiao Fu

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2024, vol. 184, issue C

Abstract: The asymmetric behavior of individuals plays a necessary role in the rapid development of human society. Typically, behaviors and acceptability of influential individuals exert influence on the strategy choices of others, but the influence flows mainly in one direction, which shows asymmetric emotions in the cooperative process. Based on this fact, this paper proposes a new prisoner’s dilemma game model involving unidirectional acceptability on interdependent networks. Individuals with higher social influence are segregated spatially in upper network layers, while others with lower influence are located in lower network layers. And two parameters are introduced to the calculation of an individual’s fitness in the model. Simulation results show that individuals who pay more attention to the average acceptability of individuals in the upper network layer promote cooperative behavior in the upper network layer in case of high temptation under unidirectional acceptability mechanisms. Moreover, the high coupling strength between interdependent networks promotes cooperative behavior in the system. In summary, these results may offer insights to underscore the pivotal role played by asymmetric emotion in promoting cooperation.

Keywords: Prisoner’s dilemma game; Asymmetric acceptability; Network reciprocity; Cooperative behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:184:y:2024:i:c:s0960077924005824

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2024.115030

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