Collective-risk social dilemma on the risk-driven dynamic networks

Min Hu and Wei Chen

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2024, vol. 184, issue C

Abstract: A collective-risk social dilemma assumes a risk to lost personal endowments if a common target for individuals fails to achieve. Yet in real-world society, individuals are apt to get away from collective failure. Here, a risk-based coevolution mechanism is proposed to study the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma. Players can avert collective failure in the future by reconfiguring groups in terms of collective failure probability. The results show that increasing the target threshold enhances the evolution. Moreover, frequent underlying network reconfiguration provides a better environment for cooperators to propagate. However, defection is best favored for moderate time scales under the condition of a weak synergetic effect. Nevertheless, the opposite results emerge for a strong synergetic effect. Furthermore, different synergetic effects also impose different impacts on the evolution of cooperation as the function of investment levels. Our work aims to explore how quickly individuals should adjust the partnerships to maximize cooperation and may be helpful in understanding the role of network reconfiguration in the evolution of collective cooperation in avoiding failure.

Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Co-evolution; Collective-risk game; Risk threshold (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:184:y:2024:i:c:s0960077924006106

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2024.115058

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