Balancing peer preference and payoff pursuit in migration shapes social cohesion within unequal endowment populations

Xiaoyue Wang, Zhixue He, Ju Chen, Mingjuan Zhang and Lei Shi

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2025, vol. 191, issue C

Abstract: Social cohesion, defined by mutual cooperation and robust social connections, is fundamental for addressing collective challenges. With the growing prevalence of inequality in modern societies, its potential impact on the formation of social cohesion cannot be overlooked. This study investigates social cohesion within a population by incorporating individuals with binary endowments (including both rich and poor) into a migration model. Individuals’ migration decisions are driven by both peer preference and payoff pursuit. Our results reveal diverse spatial patterns: while peer preference leads to small, scattered clusters, payoff pursuit promotes spontaneous aggregation and sustains high levels of cooperation within the population, thereby enhancing social cohesion. In particular, interactions between rich and poor are critical for maintaining large-scale cooperation during self-organizing movements. However, excessive greed – manifested as high expectations or a strong pursuit of personal gain – can undermine social cohesion. Moreover, increasing endowment inequality further suppresses cooperation, weakening social cohesion. This study reveals the dynamics of social cohesion in populations with unequal endowments and provides new insights into the formation of social interaction, such as aggregation and segregation, through the lens of individual preferences.

Keywords: Social cohesion; Cooperation; Migration; Public goods game; Unequal endowment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:191:y:2025:i:c:s0960077924014309

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2024.115878

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