Memory-based prisoner’s dilemma game with payoff-driven preferential selection
Wenxing Ye,
Luliang Wen and
Suohai Fan
Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2025, vol. 192, issue C
Abstract:
We investigated the memory-based prisoner’s dilemma game with preferential selection on square lattice. Under the proposed selection mechanism, individuals may not randomly choose a neighbor when they imitate. Instead, each individual evaluates the recent performance by average payoff in memory length and tends to select neighbors by the pairwise difference of the average payoffs. Moreover, a factor for scaling the payoff difference is introduced to strengthen the influence of attractiveness. The simulation results reveal that cooperation benefits from small memory length while defection is enhanced by large memory length. We find that short memory length stimulates identification of cooperators that tend to gain more payoff in the short term, thereby enhancing the cooperative behavior through the proposed selection mechanism. The average payoff and strategy distribution in the spatial game are given to show the effect of the proposed selection mechanism. The modified model provides a perspective to enrich the understanding of cooperative behavior in social systems.
Keywords: Prisoner’s dilemma game; Cooperative behavior; Preferential selection; Memory length; Historical payoff (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:192:y:2025:i:c:s096007792500058x
DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2025.116045
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