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Effect of community learning mechanism on cooperation in conflict societies

Meng Zhou, Yanlong Yang and Shuwen Xiang

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2025, vol. 192, issue C

Abstract: The emergence of communities effectively promotes the cooperation under the framework of evolutionary game theory. Without adding any additional rewards or punishments, we propose a community learning mechanism that focuses on individual learning from the closest one with the highest benefit, which is used to simulate Prisoner’s Dilemma game model on a square lattice. Results indicate that the emergence of communities promotes the cooperation, and introducing this mechanisms will inevitably lead to the emergence of the largest community. Meanwhile, two major factors, including distance and population size, are discussed on how to impact the evolution of cooperation and communities. Based on these factors, our research discovers that the biggest community is more conducive to overall cooperation than small ones, which corresponds to a real phenomenon that the big counties have more stable and peaceful society and environment.

Keywords: Evolutionary game; Cooperation; Prisoner’s dilemma; Imitation learning; Community (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:192:y:2025:i:c:s0960077925000591

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2025.116046

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